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ART. II. — *A Grammar of the Greek Language*. By WILLIAM EDWARD JELF, B. D., late Student and Censor of Christ Church. Third Edition, enlarged and improved; with an additional Index to the Constructions of the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles. Vol. I. — *Accidence*. Vol. II. — *Syntax*. Oxford and London: John Henry and James Parker. 1861. 8vo. pp. xxxiv., 483, 700.

THERE is no greater mistake than the idea that grammatical science has been stationary during the last quarter of a century. The fact is, very few departments of knowledge can show a more satisfactory progress. When we consider the large place that is given to grammatical training in the education of youth in every enlightened country, we shall certainly not be disposed to underrate the importance of every step by which the grammars of the two classic tongues (upon which that training is chiefly based) are raised to a higher position as scientific treatises, and are changed from mere collections of isolated facts to philosophic expositions of the laws of human thought as it finds expression in language.

Many, who have noticed this progress chiefly in the additional length, and too often additional obscurity, of elementary school-books, have even regretted the change, and have sighed for the old days of Adams's Latin Grammar and the Gloucester Greek Grammar. We sympathize with this feeling so far as to believe that the cause of classical education would be decidedly advanced by carefully prepared elementary grammars, containing only the briefest and clearest statement of fundamental principles. Such works need not be larger than the discarded text-books just mentioned, which would include all that the beginner ought to commit to memory. They must, of course, be much fuller in the etymology and the earlier chapters, which exercise the memory chiefly, than in the syntax, which exercises the reasoning powers, and needs practice for a proper comprehension of its rules. These, however, should be mere skeletons of the larger grammars, to which the more advanced student must look for an answer to the numerous questions that constantly arise in his reading

and writing. Experience seems to show more and more conclusively, every year, that, while the details of Latin and Greek syntax can never be understood by being mechanically committed to memory, the rudiments of grammar can never be thoroughly mastered by any other process. Such elementary works as we refer to could show the progress of grammatical science in many important points. For example, we would not teach boys that the aorist imperative *τύψον* means *have struck*, as the Gloucester Grammar did, but we would tell them what this tense really means, and at the same time give a brief but intelligible statement of the various senses (including both past and future) of the aorist infinitive and the aorist optative, — an explanation for which we should look in vain in any grammar (great or small) written more than twenty-five years ago, although the forms occur in almost every page of Greek.

Perhaps no better example can be found to illustrate the advance in grammatical science to which we refer, than the one here suggested. Most scholars will start with surprise, we think, when they are told that a quarter of a century ago no one had stated distinctly the two meanings of the aorist infinitive in the sentences *φησὶ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι* and *βούλεται τοῦτο ποιῆσαι*, or those of the aorist optative in *εἶπεν ὅτι τοῦτο γένοιτο* and *εἴθε τοῦτο γένοιτο*. Yet such is the fact. The prevailing dictum on the whole subject was that which we still find in the twentieth edition of Buttmann (1858), that the present and aorist of the dependent moods make no designation of time whatever, *bezeichnen durchaus keine Zeit*. We do not mean that scholars of that day were ignorant of the true meaning of these forms in particular cases, for common sense or the context will generally decide that; but they had never systematized their knowledge so as to perceive and state the simple principles on which the meaning in each case depends. If any one doubts our statement, we commend him to the two volumes of Matthiæ, and the two volumes of Kühner's *Ausführliche Grammatik* (1834–35), assuring him that in the whole two thousand pages he will find nothing to enlighten him on these simple questions. But occasionally the want of a correct theory led even the ablest

of the older scholars astray. We find a singular illustration of this in the discussions on the verse of Æschylus (Agamemnon, 564),

γυναικα πιστήν δ' ἐν δόμοις εὔροι μολών,

where, on every recognized principle of the language, εὔροι must mean *may he find*. Yet Matthiæ calls this *oratio obliqua*, explaining it as depending on εἰπὲ ὅτι understood, and translating it *tell him that he will find*. Strangely enough, he was followed by the great Hermann himself, who even ridiculed Blomfield for translating the verse correctly. To conclude the remarkable history of this passage, one of the latest editors, Paley, attacks Hermann's explanation only on the ground that the leading verb is not past, admitting that, if we had εἶπεν ὅτι εὔροι, we could translate it *he said that he would find*. This phrase, however, could never mean anything but *he said that he had found*, a fact which the older scholars seem to have overlooked in their theories, although they recognized it constantly in their practice.

The progress in grammatical science during the last twenty-five years has not been marked by many elaborate treatises; the most famous works of this nature — Matthiæ's two volumes, Hermann's four books on the Particle ἄν, and even Kühner's larger Grammar — belong to the preceding period. The advanced state of our present knowledge is due mainly to discussions of particular passages in editions of the classics, in philological reviews, and in the numberless monographs with which the German press annually swarms. There is hardly a principle that has not been subjected to criticism and revision, and hardly an idiom that has not received some new light from these active investigations. The older grammarians seem often to have supplied merely the material from which their successors were to elaborate a system of rules. If any one will read Lobeck's *Parerga* to Phrynichus, Cap. VI. (*De Constructione Verbi μέλλειν et affinium Verborum*), he will find the material collected for establishing some of the most important principles of Greek syntax, principles which a modern grammarian could state in ten lines, but which seem to have been very dimly apprehended by Lobeck himself. The case is

the same with the immense mass of examples collected by Matthiæ; he has unconsciously aided in the illustration of many a principle which never occurred to him.

While, therefore, we have faith in simple grammars for teaching the rudiments, we believe also in larger treatises for those who wish to study grammar as a science, as every classical scholar should study it. We have no fault to find with Mr. Jelf's work on the ground that it devotes more than twelve hundred pages to Greek grammar. But what we have a right to demand is, that such elaborate works shall be not merely large, but scientific, in the highest sense of that word; that the phenomena shall be so classified that the mass of illustration shall not bury the principles, but rather make them more conspicuous. A grammar of twelve hundred pages thus scientifically arranged differs from an unscientific treatise, for all practical purposes, as thoroughly as a museum of natural history, properly classified and catalogued, would differ from one in which the specimens were thrown in heaps upon the floor as they were brought in. Above all, we have a right to expect of every man who prepares a book for the instruction of youth, that he shall render himself, as far as he can, competent to the task; that he shall first make his own mind clear on all points of his subject, and then labor long and anxiously to express his meaning in the clearest possible language; that he shall spare no study that may tend to simplify what has usually been left obscure, and, at all events, that he shall acquaint himself with what has been done with this object by his predecessors; and, finally, that he shall never attempt to impose upon his readers by learned language on subjects which he does not himself understand, trusting to their inability to distinguish between learning and nonsense. The man who, from carelessness or incompetency, drugs the mind of youth with antiquated nonsense, where plain common sense ought to be at his disposal, thus retarding the mental development of thousands to save himself the labor of investigation, is hardly less guilty than the ignorant or careless physician who poisons the body by his noxious drugs.

We are sorry to be compelled to say that the work before us illustrates all of the vices and none of the virtues which we

have mentioned. Jelf's Greek Grammar first appeared in 1842 and 1845, under the title, "A Grammar of the Greek Language, chiefly from the German of Raphael Kühner." This was a valuable contribution to grammatical literature, as it was the only English translation ever made of Kühner's larger Grammar, which was published at Hannover, in two volumes, in 1834 and 1835. It in fact represented the science as it stood at that date; and as Kühner's Grammar was the best work of the kind that Germany had produced (Buttmann's *Ausführliche Grammatik* unfortunately never having been completed), it was warmly welcomed by English scholars. We are not sure how far we ought to rely upon the statement made by the publishers, that the work "is now in general use at Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, and Durham; at Eton, King's College, London, and other public schools." It is constantly referred to as a high authority in Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon; and it is mentioned as the first of the "greater grammars" in use at Oxford in the recent work entitled "Pass and Class," which we may consider good authority for that University. The present edition is the third; it appears without the name of Kühner on the title-page, and we find no reference to that scholar's labors in the Preface. Still the work is to no small extent based upon Kühner's, as a slight inspection will show; indeed, we are inclined to think that the omission of his name from Mr. Jelf's new Preface is accidental. We must add, however, that Mr. Jelf has clearly consulted Kühner's reputation in omitting his name; for no one who has the least acquaintance with the standard of German scholarship can believe that Kühner would have republished his *Ausführliche Grammatik* in 1861 without introducing numerous important modifications and corrections. Kühner was the first to suggest many questions which, since his work appeared, have been thoroughly discussed and better understood; and we are sure that there are many such points upon which he would never have republished his first speculations without revision, and that he would not have thanked Mr. Jelf for so doing without omitting his name.

Following the title-page as our authority, we must deal with the whole work before us as the production of Mr. Jelf.

We have no disposition to depreciate the real value of the book, which indeed is too well known to scholars in its earlier editions to need commendation at this late day. The index of quotations at the end of the first volume, containing ninety-eight closely-printed pages, and referring to about seventeen thousand examples, most of which are quoted in the syntax, is a work for which all scholars will be grateful; and the mere collection of such a mass of examples, however imperfect the text which they illustrate, is a real service to scholarship. The question which we have to consider, however, is not whether the book has merits, but whether it is what scholars have a right to expect from a work of such high pretensions and reputation. It is by far the most extensive work on Greek grammar ever published in English; and it was certainly to be anticipated that a new edition, published at Oxford in 1861, should exhibit the latest results of both English and German scholarship. Many on this side of the ocean, attracted by Mr. Jelf's name and the previous reputation of the book, will send for it, hoping in return for the high English price (£ 1 10s.) to find in its twelve hundred pages the most satisfactory explanation that modern erudition can offer of every phenomenon of the Greek language. We should not do justice to such persons, who are by no means few, if we hesitated to tell them plainly that they will be disappointed. They will find the book unsatisfactory and deficient just where they most need its help; and in many of the most important discussions they will find it hopelessly blind and erroneous,—in fact, worse than useless.

These are grave charges; and we ask no one to give them credence farther than we shall establish them to the very letter by quotations from the book itself. We shall select our examples chiefly from those parts of the syntax in which Mr. Jelf has been least able to rely upon his chief authority, Kühner, and has therefore had the best opportunity to display his own scholarship. At the same time, we intend to confine our criticism to points upon which no scholar who has taken ordinary means to make himself acquainted with the subject can have the slightest excuse for ignorance, or even uncertainty.

Mr. Jelf thus begins his discussion of the simplest form of conditional sentences :—

“ § 853, 1. Εἰ with any tense of the indicative.

“ The thing supposed is really an actual fact, though, for the sake of politeness or a form of argument, it is stated hypothetically, as εἰ λέγεις τοῦτο ἀμαρτάνεις: cf. Eur. Phoen. 1201; or where that which is really a supposition is, for the sake of argument, or out of deference to the view of some one else, stated as a fact.”

We wonder that Mr. Jelf, before he had described this circle, did not see the simple truth, that such a sentence implies *nothing whatever* as to the reality of the thing supposed, or even as to the speaker's opinion about its reality; it is a simple supposition, and that is the end of it. Mr. Jelf's faith in the common formula that “ *the condition is regarded as certain,*” which satisfied him in the first edition, seems to have been shaken by two examples from St. Paul, — 1 Cor. xv. 16 : εἰ γὰρ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, οὐδὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται, *for if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised*, and Rom. iv. 2 : εἰ γὰρ Ἀβραὰμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, *for if Abraham was justified by works, &c.* Hence the marvellous comprehensiveness of the new rule. The finishing touch, however, is added in *Obs. 1 :—*

“ It will generally be found that the protasis and apodosis taken together give the real view of the speaker, however much in one or the other it [?] may be supported for the sake of politeness.”

Of course it will, Mr. Jelf; and for the simple reason that most Greek writers, and especially the Apostles, were honest men. When the “ *protasis and apodosis taken together* ” do not “ *give the real view of the speaker,*” the speaker does not make a blunder in syntax (as Mr. Jelf seems to imagine), he simply tells a lie. We are grieved to see Mr. Jelf extenuating so grave an offence by such mild language.

We find in § 429, 1, the following simple rule for the use of the infinitive and participle with the adverb ἄν :—

“ When the construction changes from the *Verbum finitum* to the Inf. or Part., ἄν is joined to these forms, if it would have been used in the construction with the *Verbum finitum*. The particular tense and mood for which it stands is of course decided by the context.”

This is a principle which must be understood (at least in practice) before a student can translate correctly the simplest Greek author. In a treatise so elaborate as Mr. Jelf's we should look for a clearer statement of the rule, and especially for some allusion to the well-known limitation, that each tense of the infinitive or participle with *ἄν* is equivalent to the *corresponding tense* of the finite mood with *ἄν* (imperfect and pluperfect being included under present and perfect in the infinitive and participle). Even a few well-chosen examples might have made this clear. Mr. Jelf, however, shows by his attempts to illustrate the principle that he has not the most elementary understanding of the rule, which he has translated from Kühner, § 455. At least we can draw no other conclusion from the following:—

“*a.* Infinitive used for the Opt. with *ἄν*; as, εἴ τι ἔχει or ἔχοι, ἔφη, δώσειν *ἄν*: Hdt. VI. 129 ἀποστυγέων γαμβρόν *ἄν* ἔτι γενέσθαι — Cleisthenes said, γαμβρὸς οὐκ *ἄν* μοι γένοιο: Thuc. II. 30 νομίζοντες . . . ῥαδίως *ἄν* σφίσι τὰλλα προσχωρήσειν: Id. V. 82 νομίζων μέγιστον *ἄν* σφᾶς ὠφελήσιν: Xen. Cyr. I. 5, 2 ἐνόμιζεν . . . πάντων γε *ἄν* τῶν περίξ ῥαδίως ἄρξειν: Dem. 467 fin. οἷς *ἄν* ὁ νόμος βλάψειν ὑμᾶς φαίνεται: so with an infinitive followed by a finite verb with *ἄν*, signifying the possibility of the infinitival notion: Thuc. V. 105 πολλὰ *ἄν* τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν (= ἂ *ἄν* εἴποι, which he might say if he pleased) ξυνελὼν μάλιστα *ἄν* δηλώσειεν.”

What is proved by these examples, except Mr. Jelf's hopeless confusion of ideas on the whole subject, we will not attempt to say; they have certainly no more to do with the rule to which they are attached, than with the rule of three. Four of them were incautiously left in Mr. Jelf's way by Kühner, who had used them for a different purpose. The first example, if it is what Mr. Jelf imagines, is simply bad Greek; δώσειν *ἄν* would be a rare exception in Attic prose under any circumstances, and as an indirect quotation of δώσοι *ἄν* (which Mr. Jelf's rule would make it) it would be as great a solecism as δώσοι *ἄν* itself. The first two examples from Thucydides are probably authentic cases of *ἄν* with the future infinitive; but they represent the future *indicative* with *ἄν*, not the *optative*, and therefore have nothing to do with the remark that precedes them. They are simply irregularities in construction, which should be kept religiously concealed

from the learner until he is master of the rule which they violate, and should then appear in a note, like all exceptions. As examples under the rule itself, they can convey no other idea than that the future optative with ἄν is in good use in Greek, and that the future infinitive representing it is as common a construction as γενέσθαι ἄν for γένοιτο ἄν. The same remark applies to the example from Demosthenes, except that the ἄν here has barely the weight of manuscript authority in its favor, and is omitted in most modern editions. The example from Xenophon is unjustly left by Mr. Jelf in bad company; a glance at L. Dindorf's critical edition of the Cyropædia (published at Oxford four years before Mr. Jelf's work) would have shown that ἄν τῶν is merely the blunder of a single copyist for αὐτῶν, and that the manuscript authority is decidedly in favor of τῶν. In the example from Herodotus the ἄν is now generally omitted on manuscript authority (see Baehr's note); the strongest argument for retaining it is, in fact, the very harshness of the expression, into which a copyist could hardly have blundered. In any case, it can be defended only as one of the rarest of exceptions, like Aristophanes, *Nub.* 1130, βουλήσεται καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τυχεῖν ὦν, which makes the absurdity of introducing it as an example here still more glaring. We will not insult our readers by soberly criticising Mr. Jelf's final comment on Thucydides. We prefer to leave it in all its native purity, commending it to the special attention of New England Freshmen, who will, we trust, be able to decide upon the "*possibility*" of any "*infinitival notion*" by which πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν can be tortured into ἂν ἄν εἴποι, *which he might say if he pleased!*

Will Mr. Jelf, in his next edition, be kind enough to add a few examples to § 429, 1, *a*?

Our last quotation from Mr. Jelf has the merit of clearness, on one point at least; let us now notice a specimen of obscurity. In § 394, 9, *Obs.* 1, we read:—

"The Infinitive and Participle express the time of the action as past, present, or future, (λέξαι, λέγειν, λέξεω,) merely in reference to the verb on which it [*sic*] depends, without defining it by referring it to the time present to the speaker or some other action, relatively to which it is past, present, or future; nor is the time of the action necessarily the

same as that of the verb on which it depends; so that the different forms of the Part. and Infin. past, present, or future, may be used indifferently with a past, present, or future verb, and mostly the secondary forces of the respective tenses (see § 395, *Obs.* 2)."

Then follow examples, which ought to give any one who reads them a clearer idea of the tenses of the infinitive and participle than Mr. Jelf seems to have gained from them. Let no one imagine that all this is the necessary obscurity of a difficult subject. It is a matter which any intelligent boy of fourteen who knows the elements of Greek can understand with perfect ease; and there is no conceivable excuse for publishing such nonsense as we have just quoted. Mr. Jelf makes no attempt to state the difference between the infinitive in indirect discourse (after verbs of *saying*, *thinking*, &c.), — where the distinction of tense is fully preserved, the aorist referring to the past, as in the indicative, — and the more common infinitive used merely as a verbal noun after a great variety of verbs (those of *wishing* and *commanding* for example), where no distinction of time is expressed by the tenses. The first clause of Mr. Jelf's remark may perhaps be intended to apply to the former of these two constructions; what the rest of it may possibly mean we shudder to contemplate.

Mr. Jelf gives a singularly one-sided statement of the meaning of the aorist infinitive in § 405, 4: —

"Thus the aorist infinitive is used to express merely a simple verbal notion, without the accident of time, whether past, present, or future."

He adds this sage observation, which we cannot characterize by any milder term than as a display of the grossest ignorance on a simple elementary subject: —

"The aorist infinitive is of course used in sentences which denote a past event; but the past time is signified rather by the principal verb, on which the Inf. depends, than by the aorist; and the present or aorist is used, as it is or is not intended to bring forward the notion of time."

We wish Mr. Jelf would explain, on his principles, the force of the aorist infinitive in one of the very first sentences of the *Cyropædia*: *πατὴρ δὲ ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται γενέσθαι Καμ-*

βύσου. Here is clearly an aorist infinitive referring to the past, but there is no leading verb in a past tense to give it that signification; it is simply a regular aorist (like the aorist indicative or optative in indirect discourse), denoting past time on its own account. There is no attempt in Mr. Jelf's entire book, except in the sentence just quoted, to explain this simple construction, which is found in almost every page of Greek. We are tempted to ask, whether this is the most approved statement of these principles which England can give us, and whether this is satisfactory doctrine to "Eton, King's College, and other public schools," not to mention "Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, and Durham."

Mr. Jelf is particularly unfortunate in his comments on Thucydides. The following remark, let us hope, has some meaning to his mind, although we are unable to see any:—

"In the difficult [?] passage of Thuc. IV. 9, ἐπισπάσασθαι αὐτοὺς ἡγήτο προθυμήσεσθαι, if the Aor. follows the future, the time is dropped, as being sufficiently brought forward by προθυμήσεσθαι: if the Aor. be taken before the future, the attractive character of the spot is stated, while its future effects are denoted by προθυμήσεσθαι." — p. 75.

The only difficulty here lies in the peculiar force of the middle voice of ἐπισπάσασθαι, *to allow themselves to be drawn on* (*sich dahin locken zu lassen*, Krüger); there is not the slightest irregularity, or even peculiarity, in the use of the tenses, or anything that requires comment; still less is there any possible doubt that the aorist *follows* the future. Mr. Jelf seems utterly unacquainted with the simple principle by which the infinitive preserves the distinctions of tense after ἡγέομαι, and loses them after προθυμέομαι. Does he presume upon a similar ignorance in all the schoolboys who may use his grammar?

In § 394, 8, *Obs.* 3, we find the important remark, that "the present infinitive performs as well the functions of the imperfect, as the perfect those of the pluperfect." But we strongly suspect that this principle is very dimly apprehended by Mr. Jelf; for on the very same page we find a long series of examples of the *imperfect* infinitive quoted as cases of the present infinitive used for the aorist! The imperfect infinitive

tive has nothing in common with the aorist but its reference to the past, the two being related precisely like the imperfect and aorist indicative.

Mr. Jelf is somewhat weak on the tenses of the infinitive, as we have seen ; but we were utterly unprepared for such an exhibition of carelessness (to use a mild term) as we find in § 672, *Obs* 1 : —

“*Ἐφη αὐτὸς ποιεῖν, he said that he (himself) would do it ; ἔφη αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, he said that he (another person) would do it.*”

We ask, in astonishment, whether such Greek as this would be allowed to pass at an Oxford examination, or even at an English public school.

In the following passage (§ 429, 4, *Obs.* 2) all that is true is unintelligible, and all that is intelligible is false : —

“*Ἄν* is frequently joined with a Participle standing in a gerundial or adverbial force with a verb already modified with *ἄν* ; as, Xen. Cyr. I. 3, 11 *στὰς ἄν, ἰφ' ἡ ἴσθην* — *ἔπειτα λέγοιμ' ἄν*. So [?] with two participles expressing conditional action, Thuc. V. 105 *εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἄν* — *ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν γενομένους (ἰφ' you were) δρῶντας ἄν (that you would do) αὐτό*. And sometimes *ἄν* is joined to a Participle which stands for a conditional sentence into which it may be resolved : as Soph. Œ. R. 446 *συθείς τ' ἄν οὐκ ἄν ἀλγύναις πλέον* : Hdt. VII. 139 *ὁρῶντες ἄν ἐχρήσαντο ἄν*.”

We can here see into the geological structure of one of Mr. Jelf's wonderful rules. The first sentence, with the example from Xenophon, is a bungling translation from Kühner (§ 455, 3, *Anm.* 2), with the omission of the most important part of the original, in which it is stated that the *ἄν* does not belong to the participle, but to the following verb, with which it is repeated. Unfortunately, Kühner does not translate the example ; Mr. Jelf is therefore thrown upon his own resources, and makes a blunder which few intelligent schoolboys would fail to detect. Instead of explaining the passage (which would seem ludicrous), we will merely quote it in full : *Στὰς ἄν ὥσπερ οὗτος ἐπὶ τῇ εἰσόδῳ, ἔπειτα ὁπότε βούλοιτο παριέναι ἐπ' ἄριστον, λέγοιμ' ἄν ὅτι οὐπω δυνατόν τῷ ἀρίστῳ ἐντυχεῖν*. If *στὰς ἄν* (or even *στάς* alone) meant *if I stood*, as Mr. Jelf thinks, the example would have nothing whatever to do with

the rule, except so far as it opposed it. The succeeding remark of Mr. Jelf seems intended to illustrate still further the lucid idea evolved in the preceding. The example from Thucydides, where *γενομένους* (not *γενομένους ἄν*) has the force of a protasis, has nothing whatever to do with the preceding one, unless we adopt Mr. Jelf's strange rendering of *στὰς ἄν*, in which case both examples are alike irrelevant. The concluding sentence, with its first example, is again taken from Kühner, with the omission of his second warning against Mr. Jelf's blunder of taking the first *ἄν* with the participle, — a blunder into which we had supposed no one in this generation could fall. The last example from Herodotus, we confess, took us by surprise. If Herodotus ever coolly and calmly wrote such a sentence as *ὁρῶντες ἄν ἐχρήσαντο ἄν*, meaning *if they had seen it they would have used it*, the foundations of Greek syntax are indeed shaken, and Mr. Jelf's Greek at once becomes classic. A mere glance at the passage in Herodotus, however, relieved our anxiety; Mr. Jelf has merely omitted six words in the quotation, which reads, *ὁρῶντες ἄν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας μηδίζοντας ὁμολογίῃ ἄν ἐχρήσαντο πρὸς Ξέρξεα*. Here, as in the three other examples, we have the ordinary repetition of *ἄν*, which is too common to need special illustration, especially as Mr. Jelf, on the next page but one, quotes no less than twenty examples of it, fifteen of which he found in Kühner.

It is hard to leave one of Mr. Jelf's pages after we have begun to examine it, and we must add a single specimen from the remark that follows our last quotation: —

“The Inf. and Part. of the Pres. or Aorist with *ἄν* have a semi-future sense, inasmuch as a conditional action is at the present time uncertain; as, *οἰδά σε πάντ' ἄν φοβηθέντα*, *that you would [fear]*.”

Here we detect traces of a remarkable mental process. In his first edition Mr. Jelf had said that these forms had a *future* sense, — which is very true, but only half of the truth. It seems to us that he must have had an indistinct recollection of some passage in which the example just quoted meant, *I know that you would have feared*, which made him unwilling to repeat so decided a word as *future* in his new edition, and

that he conceived the brilliant idea of combining all possible significations in his new phrase, *semi-future*! By whatever process he came to the idea, he certainly chose a most unfortunate phrase; for there is no half-way meaning possible in φοβηθέντα ἄν, which is either *past*, and means *would have feared* (being equivalent to ἐφοβήθησιν ἄν), or *future*, and means *would hereafter fear* (being equivalent to φοβηθείησιν ἄν). The context will always decide between the two. On the same principle, οἶδά σε πάντ' ἄν φοβούμενον, if we add the condition εἰ γένοιτο τοῦτο, must mean, *I know that you would (hereafter) fear*; while if we add εἰ ἐγένετο τοῦτο, it must mean, *I know that you would have feared* (or *would now be fearing*). Talking about words having a *semi-future* sense may be a very pretty amusement in ordinary books; but when it is used to conceal ignorance in grammars, we protest solemnly in behalf of the youth who are to study them.

We have been the more particular in exposing the errors of the last two passages quoted, because we see traces of Mr. Jelf's doctrines on these points in no less a work than the new edition of Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1861). There, in the article ἄν, we are sorry to find the statement that ἄν with the participle can represent a conditional sentence, fortified by the same example from Sophocles (Æd. R. 446) which Mr. Jelf employs. We have already noticed the fact that Mr. Jelf is constantly referred to as an authority by Liddell and Scott, and we fear that this addition may be due to his influence. We may add that Liddell and Scott still speak of the aorist participle with ἄν as having a "*sort of future sense*," — a careless expression, which we should hardly expect to find after so many careful revisions of the work in Oxford itself.

We add a final specimen from Mr. Jelf's truly marvellous attempts to obscure the meaning of the particle ἄν. Why he should wish to conceal the truth on this subject, we are at a loss to see. We will simply quote his words, which are in the very largest type, in § 424: —

"2. Ἄν therefore has a twofold force: the condition is supposed by the speaker to take place, and therefore the action is rendered more

likely — (positive use of *ἄν*) — *probably*; or the condition is supposed by the speaker not to take place, and the action is rendered less likely — negative use of *ἄν*) — *perhaps*.”

Again, just below, he tells us : —

“*a.* With the historic tenses of Ind. representing something as an absolute fact, it does not render the action thereof more likely, for the performance of a condition cannot make a fact more probable; but the addition of *ἄν* expresses that it is represented to have taken place only on a certain condition; as, *ἡμάρπρες, you were wrong: ἄν — but only supposing such or such a thing took place — but I know it did not take place, therefore you are not wrong in this case*; hence its derived sense, *ἡμάρπρες ἄν, you would have been wrong*, i. e. on such or such conditions.”

We will ask the reader merely to compare the first few lines of these two statements with one another; as to the rest, we can simply exclaim, in the words of Mr. Jelf, “*only supposing such a thing took place*”!

We must now leave the candid reader to decide whether the charges which we made against Mr. Jelf’s work have been fairly proved by the evidence which has been brought forward.

ART. III. — *Nach Jerusalem.* Von LUDWIG AUGUST FRANKL.
Leipzig. 1858. 2 tom. 12mo. · pp. 441, 516.

In August of the year 1855, it pleased a pious Jewish lady of Vienna, Eliza Herz, to set apart, as the appropriate monument for her father, the noble Simon von Lämél, the sum of fifty thousand florins, the interest of which, at four and one half per cent, should be applied to the support and education of the Jewish children in Jerusalem. In a permanent institution on Mount Zion, which should bear the name of the friend of the Austrian synagogue, she hoped to awaken a new life for the neglected and destitute of her race. The plan of the institution was carefully drawn out, in a spirit of the broadest charity, — provision being made in this Jewish school for the children of Christian and Mohammedan parents. The course